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tion and other nations continued their building programs we would shortly be in a position where our influence would be insignificant, for it must be conceded that a nation with little to reduce can not be a potent factor in any conference on reduction. A large fleet not only affords protection pending the formulation of an agreement, but it gives us influence in world affairs and guarantees our good faith in entering into a compact, for the reduction of a powerful navy with the losses which will be sustained will be proof of our earnest and sincere purpose.

PRESIDENTIAL ACTION

The time when this conference should be called and the course to be pursued is a question not for Congress but for the Chief Executive. The Constitution contemplates that his judgment shall mark the nation's policy in developing international relations. In his hands rest the responsibilities of our foreign intercourse, and while I am a sincere believer in an international compact to reduce armament and to limit this mad race of competitive building of military establishments, I would not jeopardize the safety of America or the adjustment of world difficulties, now so threatening, by forcing the hand of our President. I am willing to abide by his decision as to when this conference shall be called. By his public utter-

ances, and by his addresses, President Harding is in sympathy with the movement for a limitation of armaments. Actuated by the highest motives, far-seeing, sincere and patriotic, this great question which affects the destiny of America and the destiny of civilization can safely be entrusted to his decision.

Until he feels that the world relationships have been sufficiently stabilized to warrant his calling such a conference, let us be patient, let us remember the responsibilities that confront this great Republic, and be mindful of conditions across the seas. Dynasties have crumbled, new nations have risen upon the ruins of ancient empires, and against the outposts of stable governments surge the onslaughts of anarchy and the red forces of disorder and discord. Hate, prejudice and bitterness are united in a mad orgy to subvert the principles for which humanity has contended for centuries.

Discontent and rebellion against established law permeate every phase of our economic, social and political life. A false step now might engulf the world in darkness; precipitate action might destroy the last bulwark of liberty and sweep away the hope that we are at the dawn of a new era, when the ideals of justice, of mutual confidence and lasting peace, will shed their beneficent mantle over the world.

Reduction of Armaments

By HON. JOHN JACOB ROGERS

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

IN any discussion of reduction of armaments the following propositions seem to me fundamental:

First, Until a program for the reduction of armaments is agreed to by the principal nations of the world, including the United States, it should be the policy of

this country that our Navy should be second to none.

Second, That an international conference to consider the reduction of armaments should at the earliest practicable moment be called by the President of the United States to meet in this country.

Third, That the countries invited by

the President should be as few in number as may be consistent with the accomplishment of the purpose. The countries included should be Great Britain, France, Japan, and Italy, and possibly one or two more.

Fourth, While recognizing the importance of military as well as of naval reduction of armament I deem it unlikely that for the present we can hope for any considerable measure of success in securing an agreement for the curtailment of the land forces of the several nations.

I shall first briefly comment upon each of these four propositions and then consider at somewhat greater length the ground for hope that the world may in the near future look forward to an effective and remedial program of reduction.

I

My first proposition is that until the principal nations of the world agree our Navy should be second to none. Many well-meaning people dissent from this proposition and assert that the United States should take the initiative and set a good example to the world by reducing her armaments irrespective of the action of other nations. I should deeply deplore any such national policy. I have always been and am an advocate of maximum preparedness. I am not willing to see the United States left without defense against an emergency. Many of the advocates of solitary disarmament were opposed to the draft, to the war, and to every measure of national defense of the past decade. I can not regard their judgment in this matter as persuasive. Beyond all this, the moment we disarm by ourselves we lose the principal leverage for inducing others to disarm. The policy of nations is essentially selfish. Men call national selfishness patriotism. If our world rivals see that we have disarmed without exacting or even suggesting similar action by them they will instantly conclude

that self-interest should dissuade them from following our example. We shall simply leave ourselves a prey to attack and the cause of world-wide disarmament will not have been promoted one whit. And so, I repeat, both because I am watchful for America, first, and because I believe in world disarmament, second that I declare for a great navy until a disarmament agreement shall have been achieved.

In this connection it may perhaps be of interest to note the relative naval strength of the five great powers at this moment and at the end of the building program of each now in contemplation. I am here basing the relative strengths in terms of tonnage and for convenience shall simply state approximate total tonnage in terms of relative units of strength. Today Great Britain has $18\frac{1}{2}$ units of naval ton strength; the United States has 12 units; Japan, 5; France, 5; and Italy, 3. If the projected building program of each is completed, Great Britain will have 21 units; the United States, 20; Japan, 14; France, 7; and Italy, 4. To state the facts still more briefly, Great Britain is today about half again as strong as the United States and the United States in turn is more than twice as strong as Japan. If the building programs of all three powers are completed, in five or six years the United States will have crept up close to Great Britain and the relative strengths of Great Britain, the United States, and Japan may be indicated by the units, 21, 20, and 14. But if Great Britain and Japan proceed with their program and the United States drops out, the ratio will be Great Britain, 21; Japan, 14; and the United States, 12. The combined strength of Great Britain and Japan would then be thrice that of the United States. I do not believe that it would be wise for the United States to fall back into third place

among the naval powers of the world—and a poor third at that. Therefore, I say, let us push on with our building program until we have something better to put in its place. (See appendix, page 67, for more detailed figures.)

The foregoing comparison suggests an important fact which is often overlooked. The true strength of a single power as compared with her sister nations is not absolute, but relative. If a single savage tribe has two war canoes its navy is twice as powerful as that of its rival tribe which has but one war canoe. And a great nation which might have a hundred battle cruisers would be only twice as strong as its rival nation which had fifty battle cruisers. This doctrine of relativity is not so difficult of comprehension as Einstein's, but I venture the assertion that it is as frequently overlooked or misunderstood. It is, then, of little consequence what may be at a given moment the total naval tonnage of the United States. The important consideration is what her naval tonnage is as compared with her competitor nations. The whole purpose of the cry for disarmament is to establish a lower common denominator for the navies of the world.

II

The international conference should be called by the President of the United States and should be held within the United States. Perhaps this proposition is almost self-evident. The United States is known to be the only nation in the world free from a self-seeking international policy. Her hands are clean and her motives are suspected by none. Righteous world peace is her great objective. The President of the United States, then, is the man, above all others living, who should call the conference. The place should be the United States for much the same reason. We know the atmos-

phere of Paris in 1919. The atmosphere of any European city would have been similar. Such an atmosphere is not conducive to the success of a world project for disarmament. No such difficulty would attend a conference sitting in the United States.

III

In my view the fewer the nations in attendance, the more speedy, constructive and satisfactory will be any agreement reached. Forty or fifty nations sitting at the council table would simply conflict without corresponding recompense. Why should the Hedjaz or Siam—and I intend no disrespect to either—have a vote in the determination of the future naval strength of Great Britain, Japan, or the United States? Here again the situation at Paris in 1919, with two score or more nations clamoring at the council, should be a deterring example.

IV

Any recommendations of such a conference, however broad its scope, will probably concern themselves with naval rather than with military curtailment. Theoretically, the two stand on the same footing and are substantially equal in importance. However, at this moment, at least, there is a vast practical difference. There are only five—it might even be said only three—great naval powers, but every nation in the world has, in its degree, its land forces. Conditions in Europe are far from tranquil and we have no assurances of early improvement. France still wonders whether the menace of Germany may not be resumed. The new states in east central Europe apprehend almost daily an invasion from Russia. Whatever the basis for the fear and whatever the theoretically sound solution may be, the practical fact remains that in the near future land armaments of the

European countries will not be reduced. And, as I have sought to make clear, disarmament is a futile thing, and worse, unless accepted generally by the major powers everywhere.

So much for my four propositions. Other speakers will discuss the arguments in favor of disarmament. I shall not do so. To me the argument is so one-sided that multiplication of words is without warrant. Sensible men everywhere—while they may disagree upon the methods—agree upon the extent of the evil and upon the vital consequence of the remedy. Not merely the staggering cost of present armaments, but the threat to world peace involved in their maintenance combine to make inevitable our conclusion.

PRACTICABILITY OF REDUCTION

I shall however examine the practicability of securing concerted reduction of armament. I repeat that everyone agrees as to the desirability of the goal, but many men differ as to its feasibility of attainment. Here is a question of judgment to which no dogmatic answer can be given. My own view is emphatically that there is very definite hope of future success. Why? At hearings held by the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives in January of this year some of the most eminent men of the country, men versed in international matters and wise in judgment, agreed that a disarmament conference held promise of great achievement. Among them were the then Acting Secretary of State, Norman H. Davis; the former Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels; two of our Peace Commissioners at Paris, Mr. Henry White and General Bliss; and General Pershing. General Bliss' assertion was especially direct. He said, referring to the tendering by the United States of an invitation to a conference: "If the common people of

all the nations concerned knew that such an invitation were given, they would force their governments to a favorable response. I think that something practical can be done if the United States demands a conference with the four other powers." In response to an inquiry as to whether he meant "demand" or "suggest," General Bliss said: "I think a suggestion would be equivalent to a demand if the masses of the nations concerned know that such a suggestion has been made." General Bliss is a wise and experienced soldier, fresh from the Versailles treaty table. I trust his opinion.

It is always useful, if not conclusive, to test the prospect for the future by the experience of the past. With this viewpoint, I desire to recall the history of the agreement made with Great Britain in 1817 respecting a limitation of naval armaments on the Great Lakes on the part of the United States and Canada. The War of 1812 was ended by treaty early in 1815. In November of the latter year James Monroe, then Secretary of State, wrote John Quincy Adams, then our Minister to England, suggesting that the latter propose to the British Government such an arrangement respecting the naval forces to be kept on the Great Lakes by both governments as would demonstrate their pacific policy and secure their peace. The negotiations led to an agreement effected by an exchange of notes signed at Washington in April, 1817. This agreement provided that the naval forces thereafter to be maintained upon the Great Lakes by the two governments should thenceforth be confined to the following vessels on each side:

On Lake Ontario to one Vessel not exceeding one hundred Tons burthen and armed with one eighteen pound cannon.

On the Upper Lakes to two Vessels not

exceeding like burthen each and armed with like force.

On the waters of Lake Champlain to one Vessel not exceeding like burthen and armed with like force.

And his Royal Highness agrees, that all other armed Vessels on these Lakes shall be forthwith dismantled, and that no other Vessels of War shall be there built or armed.

It was further stipulated that an annulment of the agreement could be effected at any time by the giving of six months' notice. That agreement is one hundred and four years old. To me it is an inspiring fact that it is still in full force and effect.

Orders were immediately given by both governments for carrying the arrangement into effect. Since that time there have been occasional exchanges of correspondence relative to alleged violations of the terms of the agreement. In each instance the matter has been amicably adjusted, although in 1864 the United States went so far as to give the six months' notice of termination required by the agreement. Later the notice was withdrawn and the continuance of the agreement has since never even been threatened.

In 1898 an agreement was reached between the two governments for the creation of a Joint High Commission to which should be referred for settlement various questions pending between the United States and Canada, among which was the revision of the agreement of 1817 respecting naval vessels on the Great Lakes. It had been pointed out that in 1817 the Great Lakes were independent inland waters, there being then no navigable connection between them and the ocean. Under such circumstances to build and arm vessels on the Lakes necessarily meant their maintenance on the Lakes and their use for no other purpose than as part of a permanent armament. Moreover at the time of

making the arrangement the surrounding region was an uninhabited wilderness. The Lakes had since become highways for enormous traffic and their ports were peculiarly adapted for building certain classes of war vessels. The American section of the High Commission was therefore instructed to secure a modification of the 1817 agreement whereby such vessels might be constructed and permitted to pass down to the Atlantic Ocean. It was also pointed out that the arrangement should not be deemed to prohibit vessels equipped to train seamen and reservists and that the employment of a proper training ship should be declared not necessarily hostile to the spirit of the arrangement.

The High Commission took some steps to bring about a revision of the old agreement to conform to existing conditions but suspended its labors without reaching a definite result. During the last twenty years the old order has therefore remained unchanged, and Secretary Hughes has recently written me that an examination of the records of the Department of State discloses no recent correspondence of any importance between this government and the government of Great Britain with reference to the subject. At the present time the United States maintains about a dozen vessels of a naval character on the Great Lakes, only one of which however is of a modern type. This quota is in excess of the agreement but is by express permission of the British Government. I have recently been advised by the United States Naval Intelligence that Canada has at this time no armed ships of any description on the Great Lakes or the St. Lawrence.

The agreement has had an extraordinary success and has saved the two governments endless trouble, and much friction if not actual bloodshed. The

example is to me a most illuminating one as showing what may be accomplished between two contiguous countries by force of public opinion translated into a treaty. What has thus been once done so well and so enduringly can I believe be done again on a vastly greater scale.

Members of the Academy are doubtless familiar with the convention of 1902 between the Argentine and Chile strictly limiting naval armaments for a period of five years. Here is a more modern example tending to show that international agreements of this character have a real chance of life and of success.

In my view it would be both a criminal and a short-sighted thing if the United States should not make the

effort. Failure would not leave matters worse off and even a small measure of success in achieving an international arrangement would be a mighty sign of hope to a weary world. The question involved in the topic of disarmament is so great that to me it transcends any other international question of today. Whatever we may think about the Versailles League of Nations and the wisdom of its rejection by this country the fact must be recognized by every candid man that it is dead beyond all possibility of resurrection. A new international arrangement must be erected in its place. I hope and believe that the program for the reduction of world armament will be the keystone upon which the new international order will be constructed.

NAVAL TON STRENGTH OF THE FIVE GREAT NAVAL POWERS, PRESENT AND PROJECTED,
AS OF MAY 1, 1921

The following figures indicate as accurately as possible the number of vessels and the total tonnage of all vessels in the navies of Great Britain, the United States, Japan, France and Italy, (a) as of May 1, 1921 and (b) at the conclusion of the program now under way, authorized or projected. The table may be accepted as representing the official knowledge and information at this moment in the possession of our Navy Department.

	<i>Today</i> (actually completed)		<i>Projected</i> (includes building, authorized and projected)		<i>Total</i>	
	Vessels	Ton strength	Vessels	Ton strength	Vessels	Ton strength
Great Britain	533 of	1,854,140	117 of	259,380	550 of	2,113,520
United States	456 of	1,228,992	78 of	807,889	534 of	2,036,881
Japan	92 of	517,203	84 of	851,383	176 of	1,368,586
France	137 of	503,956	24 of	193,690	161 of	697,646
Italy	86 of	270,410	23 of	116,656	109 of	387,066

Note—¹ Includes 4 super-dreadnaughts of 55,000 tons each.

² Includes 8 vessels of type not yet known in this country, but for this table assumed to be of 10,000 tons each.

³ Includes one vessel about which we are not fully informed. Assumed to be of 24,000 tons.